Abstracts of Recent Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
The constitution of Virginia provided
that voters must have been twelve
months "householders and heads of
families." It was held that unmarried
persons living with their mother or with
younger brothers and sisters, having
charge of the family, the father being
absent or dead, are to be deemed
" housekeepers and heads of families."
And it was held further that where a
man and woman were living together as
husband and wife, it was not competent
to inquire into the legality of the mar-
riage, the man then being at the head ot
a family and a housekeeper: Draper v.
Johnson, 1 Cl. & H. 702.
W. W. THORNTON.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIQNS.
ENGLISH COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY.'
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.2
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.4
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.'
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.4
ADMIRALTY.
Collision- Contributory Neligence-Darnages.-A dumb barge, by
the negligent navigation of those in charge of her, was suffered to come
in contact with a schooner moored to a mooring buoy in the river
Thames. The schooner had her anchor hanging over her bow with the
stock above water, contrary to the Thames bye-laws. The anchor made
a hole in the barge, and caused damage to her cargo. But for the
improper position of the anchor, neither the barge nor her cargo would
have received any damage. In an action of damage by the owners of
the barge against the schooner, Held, that both vessels were to blame,
and that, therefore, the owners of the barge were entitled to half the
damage sustained: The .Margaret, L. R. 6 Prob. Div.
AMENDMENT.
Allowance of on TriaL-Where the original complaint, for work and
labor, implied but did not expressly allege a special contract, and the
answer set up a special contract, and alleged non-performance, an
I Selected from the last numbers of the Law Reports.
I From A. M. F. Randolph, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 26 Kansas Reports.
5 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 55 Maryland Reports.
' From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter; to appear in 34 N. J. Eq. Reports.
6 From Edwin F. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 53 Vermont Reports.
$ From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 52 Wis. Reports.
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amendment of the complaint at the trial so as to set up such contract
was not improperly allowed, though perhaps immaterial; and where the
amendment was made orally, and not formally filed, but was taken
down by the reporter, treated at the trial as made, and incorporated
into the record on appeal by bill of exceptions, it is treated here as an
effectual amendment to support the verdict and judgment: Kretser v.
.ary, 52 Wis.
ASSUMPSIT. See Voluntary Payment.
ATTORNEY.
Refusal by Town Agent of Solicitor to pay to Lay Client amount qf
Debt received in an Action-Summary Jurisdiction of the Oourt over its
own Officer.-The town agent of the solicitor of the plaintiff in an
action, in which judgment had been recovered for a debt of 331. 5s. and
costs, refused to pay over to the plaintiff the amount of the debt which
had been received by him from the sheriff under a writ offi. fa., on the
ground, that he was entitled to retain such amount for a debt due to
him from the country solicitor of equal amount. The country solicitor
had no lien on such amount against his client, the plaintiff. Bdd, that
the court, in the exercise of its summary jurisdiction over its own offi-
cers, would order the town agent to pay over the amount of the debt to
the plaintiff: Ex parte Edwards, L. R., 7 Q. B. Div.
BANK.
Action on Bank Note-Erasure of Number-Material Alteration.-
In an action against the Bank of England for non-payment of notes
payable to bearer issued by them, it appeared that the notes had been
bonafide purchased by the plaintiff for value, but that they had been
fraudulently obtained by the person from whom he purchased them;
and that before they were in the custody of the plaintiff, they had
been altered, by erasing the numbers upon them and substituting others,
with the object of preventing the notes from being traced. Held, that
the alteration was not material in the sense of affecting the plaintiff's
right of action on the notes, and that the defendants were liable: Suf-
fell v. Bank of England, L. R., 7 Q. B. Div.
COLLISION. See Admiralty.
COSTS.
In Equity-Defendants Severing in their Answers.-Where defend-
ants, in good faith, sever in their answers, each one may be allowed his
costs, although they all may have employed the same solicitor: Putnam
v. Clark et al., 34 N. J. Eq.
Practice in Equity- Costs-Appearance Fees.-The question of costs
is a matter within the discretion of the court below. A decree, in other
respects right, will not be disturbed, even if there was an improper
direction as to the party or fund charged with the payment of costs:
Dodge et al. v. Stanhope et al., 55 Md.
Appearance fees should not be allowed on exceptions to an au-
ditor's accounts, or other collateral proceedings in chancery upon
petition: rd.
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CRIMINAL LAW.
.'fl'fY a Railrocd Car moving from one County to another.-
T -eib ,ne tt tcrs a moving car in one county, with intent to commit a
lai .eny .n suin cat, and with the same intent continues in the car until
it ,pa ,.s into another county, and there couimits the intended larceny,
thee is in law a fresm entry in the latter county, and the offence is
inditab'as therein under the statute: Powell et al. v. The State, 52 Wis.
;Vtirder--Premeditation-Rcasonable Doubt.-While a premeditated,
deliberate intent to take life is essential to the crime of murder in the
first degree, yet, if a party goes to have an interview with another,
having armed himself with a deadly weapon, with the intent to compel
such other to do any certain thing,. or upon his refusal to kill him, such
conditional intent to take life is sufficient to make the homicide, if com-
mitted, murder in the first degree: State v. Kearly, 26 Kans.
The court, in attempting to define reasonable doubt, said : That to
exclude such doubt, the evidence must be such as to produce in the
minds of prudent men such certainty, that they would act on the con-
viction without hesitation, in their own most important affairs. Held,
that such definition and explanation did not narrow the import of the
term "reasonable doubt," to the prejudice of the substantial rights of
the defendant: Id.
Writ of Error on Judgment Quashing an Indictment-ndictment for
Receiving Stolen Goods-Common Law Offence.-A writ of error lies
on a judgment quashing an indictment on demurrer, such judgment
being a final judgment: State of iltaryland v. Hodges, 55 Md.
The offence of receiving stolen goods is in Maryland, a misdemeanor.
In such a case, it is not necessary to allege in the indictment that the
property in question was feloniously received; nor need such indict-
ment charge, that the traverser received the stolen goods for the pur-
pose of converting them to his own use : Id.
It is not necessary that the receiving should be lmcri causa. If one
receives stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, for the mere purpose
of concealment, without deriving any profit at all, or merely to assist or
aid the thief, such a receiving is within the statute: It.
But an indictment for receiving stolen goods, a common-law offence,
should charge that the same were unlawfully received: Id.
Where one is charged with a common-law offence, the mere aver.
ment that it was done contrapacem, does not dispense with the neces.
sity of setting out in proper terms, the circumstances necessary to con.-
stitute the alleged common-law offence: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Husband and Wife.
Distributian of Assets under a Deed of Trust.-The prosecution of
claims to judgment, cannot diminish the rights of a creditor in a court
of equity, who applies for a distributive share of the proceeds from the
debtor's property sold under a deed in trust: Dodge et al. v. Stanhope
et al, 55 Md.
Settlement of Accounts-Fraud on Other Creditors.-A settlement
of their accounts deliberately made by two persons, without any inten-
tion to defraud a creditor of one of them, will not be set aside in favor
of such creditor, without at least the clearest and most positive proof
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of fraud or mistake, as between the parties to such settlement: Klauber
v. Wright, Garnishee, 52 Wis.
DEED. See Equity.
EQUITY.
Reformation of Deed-Absence of Mutual Mistake or Fraud.-A
policy of insurance was issued to and in the name of the complainant's
wife, on his property, upon her application. Complainant alleged that
the policy was taken out by her in her own name instead of his, by mistake
on her part. Reformation after loss refused, on the ground that there
was no proof of mutual mistake, nor of fraud on the part of the com-
pany: Doniol v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 34 N. J. Eq.
ESTOPPEL. See Husband and Wife.
Grantee taking subject to Mortgage Estopped from acquiring Title
under Tax Levy caused by his .Default-Notice of such Title.-A pur-
chaser of real estate subject to a mortgage and in possession thereof,
and under duty to pay the taxes, for which a tax-deed was afterwards
given upon the premises, cannot acquire title thereto by purchase from
the holder of the tax-deed : Leppo v. Gilbert & Gay, 26 Kans.
The title so acquired would be void in the hands of a subsequent
purchaser, without other notice than the record of the mortgage, and
the record of the conveyances to his grantor, and the possession of the
premises by such grantor: Id.
EVIDENCE.
Declarations by Grantor subsequent to Deed.-Declarations of a gran-
tor in a deed or bill of sale, impairing the rights of those claiming under
the instrument, made subsequent to its execution, by which declara-
tions, claims barred by the Statute of Limitations would be revived,
are inadmissible against the grantee and those claiming under it: Dodge
v. Stanhope, 55 Md.
FENCE.
Built on Land of Another.-Where a fence is built, as a permanent
structure, by one person upon the land of another, without any agree-
ment between the parties as to a right of removal, it becomes a part of
the realty; and the owner of the land may remove it and dispose of the
material at his pleasure. This rule applies to rails laid into a fence,
though not attached to the land otherwise than by their weight; and it
is not affected by the fact, that the person who built the fence believed
that he was erecting it on his own land: Kimball v. Adams et al., 52
Wis.
FIXTURE. See ence.
Wooden Building detached from Rouse.-The complaint alleged
among other things, that plaintiff was the owner and in possession of
certain lands, and that defendant entered thereon and carried away and
converted to his own.use, a certain building situate thereon, &c. The
answer set up, that defendant was sheriff, and as such, levied upon and
took into his custody said building, by virtue of an execution against
plaintiff. On the land described in the complaint, was a house occupied
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by plaintiff and family as a residence, and used also as a saloon. On one
side of this main building, and next to the saloon, a wooden structure,
thirty-two feet square, was erected by plaintiff, to be used in connec-
tion with the saloon as a dancing-hall. The sills were fastened together
at the ends with nails or spikes; the studding was fastened to the sills in
the same way, and four or five feet apart; the plates were fastened in
like manner at the top of the studding; the sills and plates were thirty-
two feet long, of two by eight or two by ten timber; the sills rested at
some places on the ground, at others on cedar posts set into the ground,
and on cedar railroad ties, and stones ; a floor was laid over the whole
space, in the centre of which stood a post eight feet high, of six by
eight timber, from the top of which four rafters extended to the plates;
and the roof was of brush. In a space between the buildings were
constructed seats for musicians, twelve feet long, upon cross-pieces
fastened to both buildings; and a door was intended to open from the
saloon into the dancing-hall. The attached building was unfinished, but
was used for the purpose intended, and was designed to be made more com-
plete and permanent, and to be permanently used in connection with
the main building, for domestic purposes and as a dancing-hall. ifeld,
that upon the facts, the court below did not err in instructing the jury,
that such attached building was a part of the realty: Lipsky v. Borg-
man, 52 Wis.
HIGHWAY.
.lnjury on Highway- Contributory Negligence-Burden of Proof-
The insufficiency of the highway must be the sole, operative cause of
the injury. If it is the joint product of the plaintiff's lack of pru-
dence, and the town's negligence, there can be no recovery: Bovee and
Wife v. Town of Danville, 53 Vt.
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show, that he contributed
nothing towards producing the accident; that the highway was insuffi-
cient; and that his conduct was prudent: Id.
The plaintiff wife was prematurely delivered of twin living children;
and the miscarriage was the result of her injuries. Any physical or
mental suffering attending the miscarriage, is a proper subject of com-
pensation. But the rule goes no farther. Any injured -feelings "fol-
lowing the miscarriage, not part of the pain naturally attending it, are
too remote to be considered an element of damage.
HOMESTEAD.
Husband cannot Lease witwut Wife's (onsent.-The husband cannot,
without the consent of the wife, execute a lease of a homestead, and
give possession thereof to a tenant, although the title to the premises
is in his own name, when the lease interferes with the possession and
enjoyment of the premises by the wife as a homestead: Coughlen, v.
Coughlen, 26 Kans.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See .Homestead.
Payment of Debts between-Fraud on Creditors.-Moneys given by
a married woman to her husband in 1855, and for which she received
no evidence or security until 1877, when he had become insolvent:
Held, not to sustain, under the circumstances, as against his existing
VOL. XlX.-96
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creditors, a transfer of property to her in 1877, but as to them to be
fraudulent: Luers et al. v. Brunjes et vx., 34 N. J. Eq.
Insolvent Law not applicable to a Married Woman.-The insolvent
law of Maryland contained in Art. 48 of the Code, and in previous
acts, does not embrace the case of a married woman as an insolvent
debtor; nor do the acts subsequent to the Code, making special pro-
vision for enabling married women to contract, and for recoveries
against them at law, extend the provisions, or affect the construction of
the insolvent law in the Code: Relief .Building Association v. Schmidt,
55 Md.
Married Woman's C venant-She is not bound by it in Joining in
Deed with Husband-Estoppel.-The principle of law, that whatever
interest or title 'the grantor acquires in the granted premises, subse-
quently to the execution of the deed, lie having conveyed with cove-
nants of warranty of title, enures for the benefit of the grantee, does
not apply to a married woman, joining in a deed with her husband:
Goodenough v. Felows, 53 Vt.
Hence a married woman is not estopped from foreclosing a mortgage,
acquired by inheritance, against one holding a subsequent mortgage"on
the same premises, given by her husband, and she joining with him : Id.
She is not liable in damages for the breach of her covenant: Id.
Not considered what might be held in equity, respecting an after-
acquired title of the separate real estate of the wife, which she bad
once conveyed for a full consideration with a general covenant of
warranty: Id.
INJUNCTION.
To Prevent the Erection of Obstructions on a Strip of Ground alleged
to be a Public Way-Agreement for the Use of Strp of" Ground.-If,
by reason of obstructions erected on a strip of ground alleged to be a
public way, the applicant for an injunction for their abatement, claim-
ing the use of the strip of ground as one of the public, and negativing
by the allegations of his bill and his testimony, all mere private right
in it, were obstructed or deprived of reasonable access to his buildings
on his lot, and thereby subjected to loss and inconvenience, that would
be such special and particular injury as would entitle him (if the alle-
gations were well founded in fact), to remedy from a court of equity.
But the applicant for such an injunction, and the purchaser of the strip
of ground having contracted with each other in respect to its use, and
the manner of user, on failure of compliance, the remedy would be on
the agreement: Gore v. Brubaker, 55 Md.
INSOLVENT. See Rusband and Wife.
INSURANCE.
Statement of Loss must be Sworn to by Owner of Property-Married
Women- Waier.-The statement of the property destroyed must be
sworn to by the owner, if so required by the by-laws of the company.
When a married woman is the owner of the property insured, it is not
sufficient that the statement is sworn to by her husband: S~oouer v.
Vermont Mutual Fire 
Is. Co., 53 Vt.
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The insurance company did not waive the defects in the statement
by proceeding to a determination of the plaintiff's claim, it not appear-
ing on what ground the claim was rejected: .1d.
JURY. See Vendor and Purchaser.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Bar of, Extinguishes the Debt-Revival by Express Promise in Writ-
ing.-It is the settled doctrine in Wisconsin, that when the Statute of
Limitations has run against a debt, the debt is extinguished, and that
the bar of the statute is not removed by any mere admission of legal
liability, but only by an unqualified promise to pay; and under sect.
37, c. 138, R. S. 1858 (sect. 4243, R.S. 1878), such promise must be
in writing, signed by the alleged debtor: Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis.
MORTGAGE.
Mortgagee may purchase Equity of Redempt ion.-There is no legal
inhibition on a mortgagor selling the mortgaged property to the
mortgagee, in satisfaction of his debt-; and where such a sale appears,
and nothing unfair or unreasonable in its circumstances or conditions
is shown by the party challenging it, it will be upheld, notwithstanding
the ancient maxim "once a mortgage, always a mortgage :" Amos v.
Livingston, 26 Kans.
Deed with Clause of Redemtion.-A deed of lands, accompanied by
a lease thereof to the grantor, containing a clause for redeeming the
lands, by paying a certain amount within a specified time, is a mort-
gage, and not defeated by the grantor's failure to make a tender wiLhin
the time limited, although the grantee took possession of the premises
at the expiration of the lease. The time for making such tender may
be extended by parol: Vliet v. Young, 34 N. J. Eq.
NEGLIGENCE. See Highway
PILOT. See Shipping.
POSSESSrON. See Way.
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. See Fence; Fixture.
REPLEVIN.
Remedies of Defendant where Plaintiff suffers Voluntary Dismissal
of Suit.-While the defendant in a replevin action has a right, not-
withstanding dismissal by the plaintiff, to an inquiry and adjudication
in that action of his claims to, and interest in, the property replevied,
and in case he avails himself of this right, can collect no more from
the sureties on plaintiff's bond than is awarded by such adjudication;
yet this is not his only remedy, for, after a voluntary dismissal by the
plaintiff, he may commence an independent action on the bond and
recover therein all his damages sustained by the taking of the property,
including therein, if the title be in him, the value of such property:
Hanning v. Manning, 26 Kans.
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SURETY. '
Securities given to Indemnfy-Subrogation of reditor.-The
oratrix was the ward of the defendant Morrill, and he executed the
mortgage in question to defendant Bates, to secure him for having
signed his guardianship bond. The mortgage was defectively exe-
cuted, having been witnessed by the wife of the mortgagee. It was
recorded; and the defendant bank had notice, in fact, of such mort-
gage, before the levy of its execution. In a petition- to foreclose the
mortgage, Held, That the oratrix, being the beneficiary under the bond,
is entitled to have the mortgage stand as a security to her for what is
due from her guardian; and, to a decree of foreclosure. MAorrill v.
.Morrill et al., 53 Vt.
When an assignment of securities is made by the principal to the
surety for indemnity merely, an implied trust is raised in favor of the
creditor, which he may enforce, on the maturity of his debt, whether
the surety has been damnified or not, and whether the surety or
principal, either or both, are insolvent: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Goods ordered from, .Manufacturer for specific and known Purpose-
Implied Warranty of reasonable fitness for such purpose-Jury- Use
of Knowledge not gained by Evidence in the Case.-When a machine is
ordered from a manufacturer for a specific and understood purpose, it
is impliedly agreed that such machine when constructed shall be reason-
ably fit for such purpose, and if, upon trial within a reasonable time, it
proves unfit, the purchaser may return the machine and rescind the
contract. Mere receipt of the machine is not such an acceptance
thereof as debars the purchaser from this right, neither is this right
destroyed by the fact that in the contract for the machine the manufac-
turer, in writing, agreed that it should be well made, of good material,
and that with proper management it would do the work intended:
Craver v. Homburg, 26 Kans.
Where the question is whether the machine purchased as above failed
through defect in its construction or in consequence of mismanagement,
and the question is, by the testimony, a doubtful one, it is material
error for the court to permit testimony that some other machine fur-
nished by the same manufacturer similarly failed: .d.
While the jury have a right in making up their verdict to use their
general knowledge such as any man may bring to the subject, yet beyond
that, they must be guided by the testimony, and may not resort to any
knowledge which they may have by reason of their familiarity with any
special business or occupation; Id.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.
Compulsion by Legal Process-The payment of a demand under com-
pulsion of legal process, accompanied by a protest that the demand is
.illegal, and that the payer intends to take measures to recover back the
money paid, is not a voluntary payment; and to constitute compulsion
of legal process, it is not necessary that the officer have seized or be
immediately about to seize property of the payer by virtue of the process,
but it is sufficient if he demands payment by virtue thereof and mani-
fests an intention to enforce collection by seizure and sale of the payer's
property at any time: Parcher v. Afurathon County, 52 Wis.
